

٠.,

The Secretary of State opened the meeting explaining that he thought it would be useful to bring the principals who would be working on the Intermediate of the principal who would be working on the Intermediate of the Intermed

A working group under the chairmanship of Mr. Eshler will give full time attention to the problem of Berlin which, undoubtedly, will occup; us all more seriously than any other problem during the ment few months. The Secretary then asked his colleagues for comments and whether they envisaged difficulties.

The Secretary of Defense felt that the recommendations requested from his particularly State. "Defense had a preliminary listing of the necessary actions on the mobilization of wan and industrial resources. These, however, must go together with governmental action as a whole.


The Secretary of State suggested that the Interdepartmental working group meet afterwards for a discussion of the problems and for preparation of a briefing of the principals.

The Secretary of Defense said that he thought it would not be vise to substitute the recommendations by July 6 without the coordinated views of the Department of State. By July 15, however, the recommendations for action could probably be integrated. Defense felt the buildup of airlift capability by October 15 could be accomplished, as could the capability for nevel action by Movember 15; however, buildup of the capability for ground action four months subsequent to October 15 required decisions shortly although not necessarily before July 15.

Mr. Hillembrand stated that possible scommatic counter-measures had been under intensive study for over a year on a tripartite basis, quadripartitely when sanctions against the COR were involved. MATO was being apprised and asked to cooperate in general sanctions. The member countries are studying the required inguislative actions for the diffectuation of sanctions. Eventually quadripartite and tripartite groups would merge and the resonmendations be whifted to MATO. The legislative problem waried from country to country. The U.K. had fewer problems than anticipated but, neverthelass, it had problems. The French Government had sufficient power; the U.S. had few problems due to deream War Zmargancy legislation still om the books. The whole business was a approblem of will and policy mere than of legislation.

The Secretary than inquired about the warious working groups acting on implementation of the instructions and he was informed by Mr. Billenbrand that

that they



. . .

that they were actively engaged in their tasks. The Secretary then asked that the various Bepartments turn on the full manpower flow to speed up action.

The Secretary said that he small work unit with Mr. Bundy arrangements for a uneting of the principale shortly defore the MSC secting scheduled for July 13 in order to facilitate action at the smatta.

Mr. Sundy said that he and General Taylor had just talked with the President and that a smetting of the full MSC was dass inportant than agreement by the principals apon the program to be presented to the President.

The Secretary them invited all the principals to come to his office, turning were the meeting to the working group moder the Chairmanning of Deputy Under Secretary Johnson. He pointed out that the meeting would, no doubt, attract press attention and that contents of the meeting must be strictly withheld from the press, but that the press could know that this was one in a series of meetings which had gone on for some time and that Serlin was the subject of the discussion.

The Secretary, before retiring to his office, gave a brief summary of the developments of the Ambassadorial group's drafting effort of the aide-memoire in answer to Mr. Khrushchev'e adde-memoire of June 4.

After the principals left with the Secretary, Mr. Johnson took the Chair. He said that Assistant Secretary Kohler, who was absent for a few days, would regularly chair the working group. Mr. Hillenbrand, Director of GER, was Secretary of the group and its focal point. It was now the principal task of the working group to get the mechanics of empleting the assignments worked out. Mr. Sullivan stated that Treasury's problem was, of course, its dependence in estimates on the magnitude of the requirement and the general position of the economy. Mr. Nitze said he could give the magnitude estimates to Treasury soon in the form of successive approximations. Mr. Johnson thought the matter could be handled in a form similar to the Los Contingency Planning. It would be mecessary to clarify where decisions were required and then to produce an integrated paper.

dir. Hillanbrand said that State smuld hope to receive from the other angencies involved at deast a cough mattine of their final plans by July 10. These swuld then be drawn tagether into a recordinated single paper by July 13, with the individual contributions as attachments. He asked that each paper contain a smarty short commany. He would distribute a model format. State was: do prepared to assist in sepredaction, typing and so on, if required.

. Hillenbrand suggested anyone cali on him if there were questions on form or problems of camplete understanding of the instructions.

Wir. Witze brought up the question of the allied stance and thought this was the Etate Department's responsibility to judge and shepherd. Mr. Hillenbrand said it was measury to run on two tracks; one maximizing the deterrent effect on the Soviets and one maximizing the convincing of our Allies. The military

contribution

contribution to be made by our Allies was an obvious planning gap which would have to be filled but at this stage it was still a unilateral exercise.

In conclusion, Mr. Johnson etated that Mr. Robler would devote himself exclusively to the Berlin problem. All his other duties had been assigned to Mr. Tyler, his Deputy, for the Time being.

COPIES TO:

٠,

U - Mr. Lewis - 1 G - Mr. Meloy - 1 EUR - Br. Winship - 2 GER - Mr. Cash - 4 SOV - Mr. Anderson - 2 9-10 RA - Mr. Burns - 1 S/P-Mr. Curtis - 2 /2-/3 INR-Mr. Lowman - 2 /2-/5 IO - Mr. Jones - 1 /6 P - Mr. Kilduff - 1 /7 B/CEA - Mr. Buchanan - 1 /8 S/B - Mr. Bohlen - 1 /8 S/O - Mr. Mautner - 2 20 - 2/

L/EUR - Mr. Kearney - 2 202-23 Amembassy Bonn - Mr. Burns - 2 24-25 USMission Berlin - 1 26 Amembassy Paris - Mr. Stoessel - 1 27 Amembassy Paris - Mr. Finn - 1 24 USRO Paris - Mr. Finletter - 1 24

32

Apar 30,3; 32

SECRET

